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We formulate and estimate a dynamic model of marriage, divorce, and remarriage using 27 
years of panel data for the entire Danish cohort born in 1960. The marital surplus is identified 
from the probability of divorce, and the surplus shares of husbands and wives from their 
willingness to enter marriage. Education and marriage order are complements in generating 
gains from marriage. Educated men and women receive a larger share of the marital gains 
but this effect is mitigated when their proportion rises. Education stabilizes marriage and 
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Modern marriage markets are characterized by high turnover; men and women divorce
more but also remarry more than in the past. However, di⁄erent individuals have di⁄erent
marital histories; they marry, divorce, and remarry at di⁄erent rates. To explain this
variation it is crucial to understand the two-sided aspect of marriage markets. Marriages
form and dissolve based on preferences and expectations of two di⁄erent individuals who
operate in a "marriage market" with many competing agents.
In this paper, we examine the marriage patterns within a large cohort consisting of
all men and women in Denmark who were born in 1960, which we observe from age 20
to age 46. We have information not only on their own attributes and marital history
but also on that of their various spouses. The spouses can belong to di⁄erent cohorts
and thus may be younger or older than the respondents. We consider two alternative
de￿nitions of marriage: legal marriages and partnerships that include legal marriages and
cohabitation. Most initial partnerships involve cohabitation but upon approaching age 46
most partnerships are marriages. The hazards of entry into and exit out of partnerships
are initially much larger than the hazards of entry and exit into regular marriage. However
long term partnerships have similar exit and entry rates to legal marriages. We mainly
analyze legal marriages. We then show that, in the long term, the matching patterns are
similar under the two de￿nitions.
We focus on marriage patterns by completed education at age 46, when men and
women are classi￿ed into three education groups. We then ask which types of individuals
are more likely to marry, to stay married, and to remarry and which types of marriage
(based on the education of both partners) are more stable. We analyze the complex
dynamic interactions between marriage, divorce and assortative matching as they evolve
over time. Assuming that agents are forward-looking such analysis requires a structural
model that speci￿es the marital preferences of men and women for di⁄erent types, their
expectations of future marital options and the marital choices that they make based on
these expectations. We also need to specify how the marriage market operates in terms of
the meeting technology and the ability of spouses to transfer economic resources between
each other in order to attract partners into marriage and maintain the stability of the
marriage.
We formulate and estimate such a model and show that it ￿ts the data well. The
general approach is matching without frictions. The basic simplifying assumption is that
2individuals can be classi￿ed into few categories. Every man (woman) is indi⁄erent between
all women (men) in the same category but still has idiosyncratic preferences over categories
(meeting one person of each category is su¢ cient). Given a large number of men and
women in each category, the share that each agent receives of the systematic gains from
marriage is the same with all potential spouses of a given category. These common share
components satisfy stability conditions and respond to the number of single men and
women of each type in a given year.
A major challenge for any economic analysis of marriage is that in most cases the
"prices" or the division of marital gains are not observed. The methodological innovation
of this paper lies in the ability to infer such transfers from data in which one observes
both marriage and divorce. Information on the dissolution of marriages of di⁄erent types
provides information on the joint value of the marriage to both partners. The willingness of
each single man and woman to enter into a particular type of marriage gives us information
on the gains from marriage that each one of them expects separately. The paper provides
a dynamic analysis of the gains from marriage, its division and the sorting by education
in a given cohort over time. In this regard we extend and complement previous work by
Choo and Siow (2006) and Chiappori, Salanie and Weiss (2011). The panel data that we
use allows us to observe both the in￿ ows and the out￿ ows into di⁄erent types of marriage,
which provides more information on the gains from marriage and its division than what
can be obtained from cross-section data.
Similar to previous studies, we ￿nd strong assortative matching by education. A novel
aspect of our data is to show that such sorting operates gradually via the selection into
￿rst and second marriages and also by the selection out of these marriages, based on the
education level of both partners. In particular we ￿nd that men with low education are
increasingly sorted out of marriage and remain or end up single. This happens because
marriages in which both partners or the men have low education dissolve at a higher rate.
Our model captures these basic features by showing that the marital output ￿ ow and the
expected marital surplus is supermodular in the education of the husband and the wife
which implies that the total aggregated marital output ￿ ow over all possible assignments,
is maximized when agents marry a spouse with the same education. Our results also
indicate that education raises the marital output ￿ ow, and that more educated men and
women receive a larger share of the marital surplus. In addition, women receive a lower
share of the marital surplus in second marriage.
A closely related paper is Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006). They estimate a dynamic
3model of marital transitions for women in the US. They include learning about match
quality, children as an exogenous event, and a three-way choice between singlehood, co-
habitation, and marriage. Our approach complements their work by emphasizing the
two-sided aspects of the marriage problem and the role of competition. A recent paper
by Gemici and Laufer (2011) extends that work to include the di⁄erent division of labor
of cohabiting and married couples. Another related paper is Aiyagari et al. (2000) that
construct a dynamic model of marriage and divorce and use calibration to simulate the
impact of policy changes such as child support. Although our data includes information
about children, we do not use that information in this work. Instead, our focus is on
assortative matching by schooling as it evolves over time and the associated shares in the
gains of marriage that partners with di⁄erent schooling obtain.
We proceed by ￿rst describing our unique Danish data in terms of the assignment
patterns by education within a cohort as it ages. We provide details on the transitions
between marriage, divorce and remarriage, separating ￿rst and second marriages. We then
describe the model and highlight the main assumptions. Finally, we present and discuss
the estimated parameters, the derived marital output ￿ ow, the estimated expected marital
surplus, and the husband￿ s and wife￿ s surplus and marital shares.
2 The sample
The data we use is register-based and is collected by Statistics Denmark. All information
is derived from public registers which are combined according to a social security number
(all Danish citizens have a social security number). The data set follows the 1960-cohort
annually from 1980-2006 (i.e. from ages 20 to 46). In order to be included in a given
year, individuals must have an address in Denmark. This implies that individuals who
are not living in Denmark in a given year are not sampled in that year and do not have a
complete marital history. We restrict the sample to individuals with records in all years
which implied that we lost around 24% of the sample (50% of these were immigrants who
were born in 1960 but entered Denmark after 1980). In addition, we eliminated those
who were married at age 20. This additional restriction caused us to lose about 4 percent
of our sample, mainly women. This leaves us with 61780 individuals.
42.1 Education groups
We distinguish between three education groups, based on level of completed education at
age 46: high school or less, vocational education, and college (de￿ned as some college or
more).
Table 1 below shows the distribution by level of education for men and women. There
is about an equal number of men and women in the sample. However, the distribution by
education di⁄ers between men and women. We see that the proportion with high school
or less is slightly higher for men, the proportion with vocational education is also higher
for men but the proportion with some college or more is higher for women.1
TABLE 1
Sample distribution of male and female completed education
Completed Education (at 46) Men Women
High school or less 0.33 0.30
Vocational education 0.41 0.37
Some college or more 0.26 0.33
No. of observations 31835 29945
2.2 Individual Marriage Patterns
2.2.1 Cohabitation and marriage
Cohabitation is a common phenomenon in Denmark (see e.g. Svarer 2004). More than
60% of all young couples are cohabiting and it is somewhat more common among men
and women with a high level of completed education. To be classi￿ed as cohabiting by
Statistics Denmark, an individual must share an address with an opposite sex person
who is not family-related, and who is no more than 15 years older or younger than the
individual. This measure is more noisy than legal marriage, since e.g. two students of
opposite sex who share a ￿ at but are not in a relationship will be registered as cohabiting.
1As mentioned, we exclude individuals for which we do not have complete marriage market histories.
The sample attrition tends to sort out the more highly educated from the ￿nal sample.
5In this paper we do not try to model the cohabitation decision explicitly but consider two
alternative de￿nitions: legal marriages and partnerships that include legal marriages and
cohabitation. A three-state model with cohabitation as a separate choice is left for future
work.2
As one can see in the Figures 1, 2 and 3, most initial partnerships involve cohabitation
but upon approaching age 46 most partnerships are marriages. Also, the hazards of entry
into and exit out of partnerships are initially much larger than the hazards of entry and
exit into regular marriage.
2.2.2 Marriage patterns by education and gender
Figure 4 shows the proportions of men and women in marriage and partnership, respec-
tively, by education. At early ages, women with medium education enter marriage and
partnership at the highest rate. Highly educated men and women delay their entry, but
by age 46 they are the most likely to be married. Men with low education are increas-
ingly left behind and by age 46 about 55% of them are unmarried and 41% are without
a partner. These time patterns are very similar for marriages and partnerships.
2.2.3 Marriage and divorce hazards
The time patterns of the proportions married can be traced back to di⁄erences in the
hazard to enter marriage, exit from marriage and to remarry in our sample. Figures 5
and 6 show the hazards of entry and exit into and out of ￿rst marriages. As one would
expect, the hazard rates into ￿rst marriage are higher for women at early ages and highly
educated men and women delay their marriage. Divorce hazards are highest in marriages
involving low education agents and lowest when the two partners are highly educated.
Hazards of entry into second marriage are higher than into ￿rst marriage.
2.2.4 Who marries whom
Conditioned on his/her education, each man (woman) can marry three types of spouses
distinguished by their level of education. The actual choices made depend on gender and
2There are di⁄erent legal implications of cohabitation vis-￿-vis formal marriage. In some respects,
couples who cohabited for more than two years least two years are considered as married. For instance,
the law stipulates that if a couple has cohabited for more than two years the partner has the right to
keep the apartment if the other partner (who originally rented the apartment) dies.
6the agent￿ s own level of education as shown in Figures 9 and 10. We see that highly
educated men marry mainly highly educated women. This proportion rises sharply as the
cohort advances in age and reaches 60% at age 46. The probability for a highly educated
man to have a wife with high school or less declines sharply, reaching 13% at age 46. About
half of the wives of men with vocational education have vocational education themselves
and this proportion remains stable as the cohort ages. Men with low education marry
mainly women with low education. With the passage of time, the proportion of marriages
of low education men with women of higher education rises, re￿ ecting the higher stability
of these marriages.
The marital choices of women are similar to those of the men with some noticeable dif-
ferences: The proportion of highly educated women that have a highly educated husband
at age 46 is 53%, which is lower than the proportion of highly educated men that have a
highly educated wife, which is 60%. The proportion of highly educated women that have
a husband with low education at age 46 is 16%, which is higher then the proportion of
highly educated men that have a wife with low education which is 13%. These di⁄erences
re￿ ect the fact that women in our sample are more educated than men and, therefore,
forced to marry a husband with less education.
The choice probabilities are similar when we replace marriages by partnerships (i.e.
legal marriage or cohabitation). For instance, conditioned on being in a partnership, the
probability that a highly educated man will be in a partnership with a highly educated
woman is 61%. The corresponding probability for educated women is 49%.
2.2.5 Second marriages
Individuals who divorce remarry quickly and the hazards of entry into second marriage
exceed the hazards of entry into ￿rst marriage (see Figure 7). This indicates that individ-
uals who divorce wish and are able to remarry rather quickly (see Browning, Chiappori,
and Weiss 2011, chapter 1). Men enter second marriages faster than women, especially
educated men. The time patterns of the marital choices of di⁄erent types of agents, con-
ditioned on ￿rst and second marriages, are also quite close to each other. This is true
for both men and women. Thus, from the point of view of the assignment, it does not
matter much if one is in a second or ￿rst marriage when one gets beyond age 30 or so.3
However, second marriages are substantially less stable than ￿rst marriages, especially if
3One exception is that the proportion of marriages in which both partners have medium education is
higher in ￿rst marriages.
7both spouses have low education. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of Svarer (2004)
using Danish data, and the ￿ndings of Parisi (2008) using British data.
2.2.6 Sorting in the marriage market
As members of the cohort advance in age and make their marriage and divorce decisions
each year, the composition of married couples by the education of the spouses and the
composition of singles by their own education both change. Changes in the degree of
sorting over time occurs mainly through two mechanisms: First, marriages in which both
partners are highly educated are the most stable and, therefore, their proportion among
all marriage rises. Second, men and women with low education are more likely to remain
single following marital dissolution and, therefore, marriages involving individuals with
low education become increasingly rare. This trend is noticeably stronger among men.
By age 46, 54% of the unmarried men have low education compared with the 31% who
have high education. The corresponding percentages among women are 46 % and 36%,
respectively. The role of education in stabilizing marriages and the di¢ culties that less
uneducated men face in marriage are not special to Denmark. Similar results for the US
are reported by Weiss and Willis (1997), Stevenson and Wolfers (2007), and Chiappori,
Salanie, and Weiss (2011).
3 A dynamic model of marriage and divorce
3.1 The general approach
We now propose a dynamic model that captures and interprets the main features observed
in our data. The general approach is matching with transferable utility and without
frictions. Within this framework, the basic simplifying assumption is that individuals can
be classi￿ed into few types. Every man (woman) is indi⁄erent between all women (men)
of the same type but still has idiosyncratic preferences over types. Given a large number
of men and women in each type, the share that each agent receives of the systematic
gains from marriage is the same for all members of a given type. These common shares
are determined by stability conditions and generally respond to market conditions. When
making choices, individuals anticipate the aggregate e⁄ects that are transmitted through
the shares of the marital surplus that husbands and wives receive each year during their
lifetime. In this framework, we analyze individual choices to marry, divorce, and remarry.
8We also analyze aggregate outcomes such as the number of men and women that remain
single, the types of marriage that are formed and survive, and the educational composition
of di⁄erent marital groups over time.
3.2 Types of Men and Women
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by men and women who can choose to be
single or marry a member of the opposite sex. All men and women live for T periods, die,
and then receive no further utility. Utility ￿ ows over these T time periods are discounted
geometrically with the discount factor R. We denote the time period by t.
Men and women are characterized by their educational attainment e which can be
either low, medium, or high. We denote the set of these three educational types by
E = fl;m;hg: Men and women are also characterized by their marital histories p. We
distinguish between men and women who have never previously been married (p = f) and
men and women who have been married previously at least once (p = s). The set of these
two divorce types is denoted by P = ff;s g: Finally, men and women are characterized
by their preferences for being single. These preferences are observed by all agents in the
model but not by the econometrician. These preference types are intended to capture the
permanent unobserved di⁄erences in the willingness to marry. We let U = f1;2g denote
the set of the two di⁄erent preference types.
In total there are thus 12 types of men which we index by the letter i 2 E ￿P ￿U, 12
types of women which we index by the letter j 2 E ￿ P ￿ U, and a total of 144 di⁄erent
types of marriages as given by all possible combinations of husband and wife types i;j.
3.3 Marriage
If married, a man of type i and a woman of type j generate together a marital output ￿ ow
that they can divide between them. We assume that the systematic component of the
marital output ￿ ow, denoted by ￿
i;j; depends on the education and marital histories of
both partners, but not on their preference type or age (although age has an indirect e⁄ect
on utility via the marital histories of the partners). We allow for full interactions in the
education of the husband and the wife so that we can test for the complementarity of male
and female education. In addition, the order of marriage enters in a separable additive
manner which allows us to rank marriages by their order. Speci￿cally, the systematic part















k is a dummy variable that takes on a di⁄erent value for each of the nine possible
combinations of husband and wife education, and H
i;j
l is a dummy variable that takes on a
di⁄erent value for each of the four combinations of husband and wife marital histories. By
assumption, the marital output ￿ ow is constant over time in each type of marriage. We
assume that upon dividing the marital output, utility is transferred between the husband
and the wife at a one-to-one exchange rate.
In addition to the systematic part ￿
i;j; partners receive a ￿ ow utility from the quality
of their match ￿t.4 The quality of match is an iid match-speci￿c random variable drawn
from a standard normal distribution, which is revealed to the partners only at the end of
each period. In this regard, marriage is an "experience good". In particular, single agents
who marry at time t do not know the quality of their match ￿t and expect it to equal the
mean which is set to zero.5
Following the realization of their match quality, the partners decide whether to con-
tinue the marriage or not. Since utility is transferable in marriage, divorce depends only
on the sums of utilities upon separation and upon remaining single. Hence, husbands
and wives "agree" on when to divorce. The total utility ￿ ow of the partners who stay
married is then ￿
i;j + ￿t: By divorcing, the partners can avoid a bad realization of their
match-speci￿c quality. However, divorce also entails a ￿xed cost of separation st which
depends on the duration of the marriage dt; through the function st = s(dt). This divorce
cost plays an important role in the model since it reduces "experimental short marriages"
and limits turnover.
3.4 Singlehood
Single agents receive a ￿ ow utility of ’t each period which depends on their gender, age,
education, and preference type. More speci￿cally, the ￿ ow utility of single agents is a sum
4This speci￿cation is borrowed from Browning et al. (2011, Chapter 6). Partners may have di⁄erent
evaluations of the marriage, ￿
a and ￿
b: We denote the sum of these evaluations by ￿: Only the sum
matters as long as partners can transfer resources to compensate each other for di⁄erences in ￿: This is
always feasible if the evaluations do not di⁄er much. To simplify, we assume here that this is the case.
5For a more general treatment of learning on match quality see Brien, Lillard and Stern (2006).
10of two terms: ￿t which depends on the gender, age, and education of the single agent,
and a constant term up that represents the ￿xed preference of the agent to be single and
takes two values (p = 1 or p = 2). Thus, the ￿ ow utility of being single for a man of type
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2 if preference Type 2:
Because we deal with a model of discrete choice, some normalizations are required.
In a static model it is customary to normalize the ￿ ow value from being single to zero.
However, in a multiperiod model, the value of marriage relative to singlehood can vary
over time. At ages above 30, we set the utility component ￿t equal to zero for all single
agents but at ages of 30 or below, we allow the utility component ￿t to depend on the
gender, age, and the education type of the single agents. We also normalize the utility
￿ ow u2 of Type 2 agents to zero in all periods.
A divorced person must remain single for a whole period. At the end of every time
period t, single agents receive iid shocks to their preferences over remaining single or
entering a marriage in period t + 1 with a husband of type i or a wife of type j, where





and assume that they are drawn from a standard extreme value distribution. These
random variables represent unobserved transitory taste considerations (or optimization
and classi￿cation errors). These taste shocks allow observationally identical individuals
to make di⁄erent choices with regard to remaining single or marrying a particular type
of spouse at time t. We assume that preference shocks revealed at the end of the time
period t, prior to the decision of single agents to remain single or marry, have no impact
on the utility ￿ ows from marriage or singlehood in subsequent periods beyond t + 1.
Since the shocks to the preferences of single agents are related to the types of spouse
whom they marry and not to individual agents, single men and women are indi⁄erent
between marrying di⁄erent agents of the same type. As a consequence, in equilibrium,
these agents must receive the same share of the expected marital surplus in a given type
11of marriage. We formalize this property by letting ￿
ij
t be the share of the expected marital
surplus that is obtained by a man of type i who marries a woman of type j in time period t
(the woman of type j receives the share 1 ￿ ￿
ij
t ). We emphasize that these parameters
re￿ ect the share from the expected surplus of the marriage, as expected at the time of
marriage.
3.5 Bellman Equations
With this characterization of the economic environment, we can introduce the Bellman
equation for the value of marriage. For that purpose, let W
ij
t (dt) be the total expected
value of an ongoing marriage between a man of type i and a woman of type j at time t,
which has lasted for dt years, prior to the realization of the match quality ￿t. The value
of the marriage after the shock is revealed is W
ij




t (dt) + ￿t = ￿













Equation (4) states that the total value of marriage plus the realized match quality
equals the sum of the systematic marital output ￿ ow ￿
ij and the match quality ￿t in the
current period t plus the discounted expected value of the marriage in the next period.
The expectation is taken over of the maximum of the two options that are available to the
couple in the next period: remain married or divorce. If the couple remains married, they
receive a utility ￿ ow equal to the total value of the marriage in the next period W
ij
t+1 (dt+1)
plus the subsequent realization of the match quality ￿t+1. If the couple decides to divorce,
each partner receives his=her expected utility as single in the next period net of his/her
share of the divorce costs s(dt+1). Because utility is transferable both within marriage
and after divorce, divorce does not depend on the surplus shares that the partners receive
within marriage nor does it depend on the division of the cost of separation, s(dt+1) (see
Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss, 2009).
The Bellman equation for marriage prior to the realization of the match quality is
W
ij














Note that (5) is obtained from (4) by eliminating the match quality shock ￿t which
appears both on the left and the right hand sides of the equality sign in (4).
In a similar fashion, we can specify the Bellman equation for the value of singlehood.
For that purpose, let V i
t be the expected value of being single for a man of type i at time
12period t, prior to the realization of the preference shocks "t+1 which are observed at the
end of period t but only a⁄ect the utility of the agent in the next time period t + 1. The
value V i































Equation (6) states that the value of being single in time period t is the ￿ ow value of
being single in the current period ’i
t plus the discounted expected value of being single
in the next period. The discounted expected value of being single in period t + 1 is the
expectation of the maximum over the options available to a single man: remain single or
marry a woman of a given type j 2 E ￿ P ￿ U. If the man chooses to remain single,
he receives a utility equal to the value of being single in the next time period plus the
realization of the preference shock. If the man decides to marry, he receives a utility equal
to the value of being single, plus his share of the marital surplus in the particular type
of marriage, plus the realization of the preference shock. Finally, the value V
j
t of being

































As is clear from the equations above, we view marriage as a risky investment that has
an asset value that can be divided between partners. The expected marital surplus that
depends only on the type of marriage is W
ij
t+1 (1) ￿ V i
t+1 ￿ V
j
t+1: Individuals with a high
draw of " may enter a marriage even if the expected marital surplus is negative, provided
that "t+1 is su¢ ciently high.


























spectively, do not depend on the "0s because a single agent with a given idiosyncratic
preference for a given type of spouse is indi⁄erent among all spouses of this type and
will not pay his/ her prospective spouse more than the "going price". These prices are
determined competitively by market conditions. Hence there is no scope for bargaining at
the time of marriage as one would have in a model with frictions. However, the separation
costs generate expost rents and bargaining. We assume that partners commit at the time
of marriage on the shares within marriage with an option to renegotiate if match quality
or market conditions change. Given this ￿ exibility, divorce is e¢ cient under transferable
utility. As researchers, we cannot observe revisions in the shares but we assume that the
13agents fully anticipate these revisions at the time of marriage when ￿ is formed. Indeed,




In the econometric speci￿cation of the shares of the marital surplus that husbands and
wives expect in equilibrium, one could in principle maintain a di⁄erent share for each
type of marriage in each time period. But such a speci￿cation would involve too many
parameters to be estimated. Instead, we model the surplus shares parametrically as a
function of husband and wife education, husband and wife marital histories, and time
(age). Speci￿cally, we assume a quadratic function of time, ￿ij +￿ijt+￿
ijt, which is then
embedded in the ratio of two exponential functions to ensure that each share takes on a




expf￿ij + ￿ijt + ￿
ijt2g
1 + expf￿ij + ￿ijt + ￿
ijt2g
: (8)
As noted before, the share ￿
ij
t is the share of the expected surplus of the marriage, as
expected at the time of marriage.
To parameterize the ￿xed cost of divorce as a function of the duration of marriage, we
introduce ten di⁄erent dummy parameters corresponding to the costs of divorce after 1,
2, 3, ... , 10 or more years of marital duration dt.
4.2 Likelihood function
The structural model is estimated by maximum likelihood, using the full set of marital
transitions from 1980 to 2006 for each of the 61780 individuals in the data set. We take
the initial state of all men and women at age 20 as given, and maximize a conditional
likelihood function. To construct the theoretical transition probabilities, it is assumed
that all men and women live to the age of 72 and receive no further utility after death.
The value of being single and the total value of marriage is then computed recursively
back to the initial observation year. The discount factor is set to R = 1
1:03:
14In a given year, an agent of a particular gender and education can ￿nd himself or herself
in a total of 242 states. A ￿rst state is de￿ned as being single with no previous marriage,
and a second state is de￿ned as being single with one or more previous marriages. The
additional 240 states are marriages characterized by the marital history of the agent, the
marital history of the spouse, the education and type of the spouse, and the duration of
the marriage.
To describe the conditional likelihood function, we index male individuals by m =
1;2;:::;Nm, female individuals by f = 1;2;:::;Nf, and time periods by t = 1;2;:::;T: Let
Omt be the observed outcome of male m at time t , and let Oft be the observed outcome of
female f at time t. Assuming independence between individuals, the conditional likelihood
























where qm is the fraction of Type 1 agents among men, qf is the fraction of Type 1 agents
among women, and p 2 f1;2g is an index for the two unobserved preference types.
In calculating the probabilities, we take into account the selection on unobservables.
In particular, we update the type probabilities of married partners based on the duration
of marriage. To maximize the conditional log-likelihood function, we use a simplex opti-
mization algorithm. The standard errors of the parameter estimates are then computed
using the outer product of the scores of the conditional log-likelihood function.
The model that we estimate assumes that all divorced men and women have to be
single for at least one year before they can remarry. In the data, we observe a few cases
(2.3 %) for which men and women move directly from one marriage to another without
being recorded as single in between. For these few cases, we assume that the ￿rst year of
the new marriage is singlehood.
4.3 Identi￿cation
The parameters of the structural model are identi￿ed from the observed divorce and mar-
riage probabilities of di⁄erent types of agents. First of all, the assumption of transferable
15utility in marriage implies that divorce probabilities are only a function of the marital
surplus in each type of marriage and the costs of divorce. The observed divorce proba-
bilities of di⁄erent types of marriage at di⁄erent durations of marriage therefore identify
the size of the marital surplus and the costs of divorce (as the divorce cost depends on
the duration of the marriage but not on the marriage type). Speci￿cally, it is seen from





t ￿ s(dt) ￿ W
i;j
t = ￿
￿1(prob of divorce in year t), (9)
where ￿ is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. Secondly, observations
on the in￿ ows to di⁄erent types of marriages by di⁄erent types of agents identify the rel-
ative shares of the total marital surplus that these types of agents expect to receive. This
can be seen by noting that equations (6) and (7) together with the assumed multinomial
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t are the absolute shares of the husband and wife, respectively, in the
expected marital output at the time of marriage, W
ij
t+1(1): Thus, the parameter ￿
i;j
t which
governs the shares of the marital surplus obtained by the husband and the wife is identi￿ed
from the willingness of single men of type i relative to the willingness of single women of
type j to enter in to a i;j-marriage at time t.
Given the expected surplus and the surplus shares, the utility ￿ ows in marriage and
in singlehood can be backed up from the Bellman equations (5), (6), and (7) using the
assumptions that life ends at age 72. Finally, the parameters of the utility level and the
share in the sample of the two unobserved preference types are identi￿ed from the slopes
of the hazards of entering marriage.
A basic assumption of the dynamic model is that agents are forward looking in making
marital decisions. Given this assumption, parameters of interest such as the ￿ ow utility
in marriage or costs of divorce, are identi￿ed from both the marriage and divorce choices
16of the agents. A simple illustration of potential forward looking behavior is indicated by
the data presented in Table 2. We see that agent types who are more likely to divorce
at ages 31-46 (averaged over durations) are less likely to marry at age 30. For instance,
low education males and females have relatively unstable marriages regardless of whom
they marry. We also see that men and women with low education are less likely to enter
marriage at age 30.
TABLE 2
Average sample divorce hazards and marriage probabilities at age 30 and 35
Wife Education Male in￿ ow
L M H 30 35
L .0487 .0458 .0598 .0485 .0426
Husband Education M .0507 .0311 .0485 .0750 .0702
H .0567 .0454 .0275 .0882 .0766
Female in￿ ow 30 .0709 .0810 .0892
35 .0434 .0571 .0811
5 Results
We now present our estimation results. We ￿rst examine the overall ￿t of the model and
then interpret the coe¢ cients. We also discuss the time patterns of the estimated expected
utilities associated with marriage and divorce states at di⁄erent ages. Finally, we present
and discuss the estimated shares from the surplus and the gains from marriage. The
detailed estimated coe¢ cients and their standard error are presented in the Appendix.
5.1 Quality of ￿t
The model ￿ts well the proportion married and the hazards of entry into ￿rst and second
marriages (see Figures 11, 12, and 14). One exception is the sharp peaks in the hazards of
entry into ￿rst marriage which are observed at ages 30 and 40 (see Figure 12)6. The model
6These peaks also appear for the cohort born in 1961. Notice, however, that when marriage and
cohabitation are combined, their are no such peaks (see Figure 2). A possible explanation for this
17also ￿ts reasonably well the divorce hazards for ￿rst and second marriages (see Figures
13 and 15), although it overpredicts divorce rates in ￿rst marriages and underpredicts
divorces in second marriages (especially for coupes with low education).
5.2 The marital output ￿ ow
Based on the estimated coe¢ cients of equation (1) we can calculate the marital output
￿ ows by the education of the spouses in di⁄erent marriages. In Table 3, we present the
values of the marital output when both partners are in their ￿rst marriage.
TABLE 3
Estimated marital output ￿ows in ￿rst marriage
Wife education
L M H
L -1.007 -0.919 -1.001
Husband education M -1.036 -0.890 -0.968
H -1.056 -0.906 -0.812
Before analyzing the details of this matrix, we note that the estimated marital output
￿ ow is negative in our model. This occurs since we have normalized the utility ￿ ow for
singles after age 30 to be zero. Under this normalization, the values of being single at
earlier ages are positive (see Appendix table). If all the options in the multinomial logit
model (the 12 marriage types and singlehood) had a utility value of zero, then they would
have an equal probability of 1
13. Given that at least 30% of agents in the sample remain
single, a typical marriage has a probability less than 1
13 which requires a negative surplus.
This in turn causes the (constant) marital output ￿ ow to be negative for all marriages.
We now note two important features of the marital output ￿ ow matrix:
Monotonicity: Moving along the main diagonal in Table 3, we see that the utility
￿ ow is lowest if both partners have a low education, then rises if both have medium edu-
cation, and then reaches its highest point if both have high education. This monotonicity
result is signi￿cant at the 1% level.
behavior is that individuals who are cohabiting want to celebrate their 30th or 40th birthdays together
with their marriage and time their marriage accordingly.
18Complementarity: Under the additivity assumption, the complementarity in educa-
tion is independent of the marriage order. We can therefore test for the supermodularity
of husband and wife education based on the estimated coe¢ cients for education in the
marital output ￿ ow for ￿rst marriages which are presented in the Table 3. Denoting
marriages by the education of the husband and the wife, this amounts to jointly testing if
(L;L) + (M;M) > (L;M) + (M;L)
(M;M) + (H;H) > (M;H) + (H;M)
(L;M) + (M;H) > (M;M) + (L;H)
(M;L) + (H;M) > (H;L) + (M;M)
Replacing these utility expressions with the estimated marriage output ￿ ows in ￿rst mar-
riage, we ￿nd that all of these four inequalities are satis￿ed as
￿1:007 ￿ 0:890 > ￿0:919 ￿ 1:036
￿0:890 ￿ 0:812 > ￿0:968 ￿ 0:906
￿0:919 ￿ 0:968 > ￿0:890 ￿ 1:001
￿1:036 ￿ 0:906 > ￿1:056 ￿ 0:890
This supermodularity result is signi￿cant at the 1% level.
The marriage order has a large and asymmetrical impact on marital output. Surpris-
ingly, a second marriage for both partners provides a higher ￿ ow than a ￿rst marriage for
both, given any level of education. This ￿nding is consistent with the higher hazard of
entry rate into second marriages compared to ￿rst marriages as displayed in ￿gure 6 and
7. We see that the matrix in Table 4 is also super modular, which means that the mar-
riage order of the two partners complement each other. However, we observe asymmetry
by gender. A match of a divorced man with a woman who is married for the ￿rst time
generates a higher marital output ￿ ow than a match between a divorced woman and a
man married for the ￿rst time.7 A possible reason for this asymmetry is the presence of
children from previous marriages that a divorced wife brings into the new marriage (see
Beaujouan 2010). Recall that we do not control explicitly for having children.
7Both of these di⁄erences in marriage order coe¢ cients mentioned above are signi￿cant at the 1%
level.
19TABLE 4
E⁄ects of marriage order on the marital output ￿ow
Wife ￿rst marriage Wife second marriage
Husband ￿rst marriage -0.0379 -0.157
Husband second marriage -0.0792 0.0918
5.3 Costs of divorce
The estimated costs of divorce are quite high and constitute about half of the sum of the
values of being single of the two partners. Since we do not control directly for children
and because the costs of separation are likely to rise over time as the average number
of children rises, we would expect the costs of separation to rise with the duration of
marriage. However we do not ￿nd such an increasing trend. Rather, the ￿rst year of
marriage has a relatively low cost of divorce and from the second year on we observe a
mild U-shape pattern with respect to duration.8
TABLE 5
Costs of divorce by duration of marriage











8The model restricts the costs of divorce to be the same in ￿rst and second marriages. We have tested
this by allowing di⁄erent divorce costs and cannot reject equality.
205.4 Unobserved types
The estimated parameters of the unobserved types are presented in Table 6. As seen
in the table, a majority of the sample have a negative unobserved ￿ ow value for being
single and, therefore, enter marriage quicker than one would expect based on observables
such as education and age. A minority of about six percent of the sample are Type 2
individuals with an unobserved utility ￿ ow of zero. This type marries at a lower rate
and divorces more. These results are similar for men and women, with a slightly higher
tendency towards marriage among women.
Following Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) we estimate the probability that each individual
in our sample is a Type 1 agent (with an estimated low utility of being single) using Bayes￿
rule. We then calculate the fraction of Type 1 agents in subgroups of our sample by taking
the average of these estimated Type 1 probabilities. In the bottom of Table 6 we see that
the subset of men and women who enter into marriage from singlehood have a higher
fraction of Type 1 agents. We also see that the subset of married men and women who
divorce have a lower fraction of Type 1 agents. The fraction of Type 1 agents (with an
estimated low utility of being single) is lowest among those who never marry and second
lowest among those who divorce twice or more.
TABLE 6.
Estimated utilities of Type 1 agents and distribution of preference types in the population
and selected groups.
Men Women
Utility u1 -0.372 -0.345
Fraction Type 1, entire population 0.942 0.936
Fraction Type 1, never married 0.834 0.782
Fraction Type 1, married at least once 0.976 0.960
Fraction Type 1, divorced at least once 0.932 0.890
Fraction Type 1, married at least twice 0.953 0.918
Fraction Type 1, divorced at least twice 0.897 0.828
21We then proceed by correlating the estimated probability that an agent is of Type 1
with a number of observed exogenous characteristics that we did not include in our model.
In Table 7 below, we show the results of this exercise.
TABLE 7
Correlation estimated probability agent is Type 1 and individual characteristics
Trait Correlation Number of observations
Parents living together in 1980 0.0463 56262
Father￿ s completed education in 1980 -0.0243 47895
Mother￿ s completed education in 1980 -0.0262 56856
Father￿ s wealth in 1980 0.0411 53095
We ￿rst construct a dummy variable equal to one if the parents of the agent are
living together in 1980. The Pearson correlation coe¢ cient between this dummy and the
estimated probability that the agent is of Type 1 is positive, indicating that agents whose
parents are living together have a stronger preference for marriage. We then assign the
numerical values of 1, 2, and 3 to the parents of the agents depending on whether they
have low, medium, or high education. We then compute the Spearman rank correlation
coe¢ cient between this index and the estimated probability that the agent is of Type
1. As can be seen in Table 7, the correlation is negative for both father￿ s and mother￿ s
education. This negative correlation could re￿ ect the fact that more educated agents
marry later. Finally, we compute the Pearson correlation coe¢ cient for father￿ s wealth in
1980 and the estimated probability that an agent is of Type 1. This correlation is positive,
implying that agents whose fathers are wealthier, are more likely to be married. All of
the correlations listed in Table 7 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 1% level.
5.5 Values
The values that the model generates for marriage and singlehood summarize the impact of
the estimated parameters on the discounted life-time utility that individuals and couples
expect at di⁄erent ages. The values of being single and being married are interrelated as
a high value for being single entails a high share of the marital output and, at the same
time, high expected values for prospective marriages entail a high value for being single.
22Both values depend on the unobserved preference to be single and in our presentation we
report values that are averaged over types.
5.5.1 Values of singlehood
The estimated values of being single V are generally positive and decline with age (see
Figure 16). Among the never married, men have a higher value than women of remaining
single at every level of education, re￿ ecting the fact that men marry later (see Figure 5).
Among all groups, men with low education have the highest value of being single.
5.5.2 Surplus
The expected marital surplus is de￿ned here as the expected joint value of a marriage
at the time of marriage minus the sum of the expected values in singlehood of the two





t . As such, it re￿ ects properties of the utility ￿ ows
in both marriage and following a divorce. As already mentioned, the utility ￿ ows are
generally nonnegative in singlehood and negative in marriage. Therefore, the expected
surplus is negative. In such a case, marriage is driven by the taste shocks, "; of the
partners. The general time pattern of the expected marital surplus at the time of marriage
is a rise during the early years (ages), as individuals delay their marriage, followed by
stability for ages beyond 30 (see Figures 17a to 17d). Similar to the marital output ￿ ow,
the marital surplus is generally supermodular in the education of the husband and the
wife. The surplus is also monotonically increasing in the education of the husband and the
wife when comparing marriages in which both spouses have the same education. In this
regard, the expected surplus inherits the properties of the systematic part of the marital
output ￿ ow. This is the case, for instance, for the surplus generated by ￿rst marriages
at age 33 in Table 8a below and the surplus generated in second marriages at age 33 in
Table 8b below.
We see that by age 33, the expected surplus is very similar in ￿rst and second mar-
riages. This holds despite the larger utility ￿ ow in second marriages that we observed
in Table 4. The reason is that the higher marital output in second marriage is o⁄set by
di⁄erences by the higher utility from being single for agents in second marriage. This
happens despite the fact that, beyond age 30, the time dependent part of utility ￿ ow from
being single ￿t is set to zero for all agents. The important element here is the unobserved
￿xed utility ￿ ow up of being single which on average takes on a higher value among men
23and women in second marriage, and thus lowers the marital surplus for this group relative
to those who are married for the ￿rst time (see Table 6).
TABLE 8a
Marital surplus of couples who ￿rst married at age 33, by education of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L -12.78 -12.75 -12.82
Husband education M -12.75 -12.64 -12.72
H -12.82 -12.71 -12.55
TABLE 8b




L -12.70 -12.68 -12.78
Husband education M -12.72 -12.63 -12.73
H -12.79 -12.70 -12.56
5.6 Surplus shares and shares from the marital gains
We have estimated 72 coe¢ cients corresponding to the speci￿cation (8). The implied
average values of the surplus share ￿ are displayed in tables 9 to 12. We recall that by
equation (10), if ￿ > :5 the husband is more keen than the wife to enter the marriage and
the opposite holds if if ￿ < :5: We see that in ￿rst and second marriages for both, ￿ roughly
equals :5: However, in marriages when only one of the partners is divorced, the partner
who is marrying for the ￿rst time is more willing to enter the marriage. Speci￿cally, if
the marriage is the ￿rst for the husband and the second for the wife ￿ > :5: while if the
husband is married for the second time and the wife is married for the ￿rst time then
￿ < :5:
Some care must be taken in interpreting the results in tables 9 to 12 because the ￿0s
represent shares from expected surplus values that are negative. For instance, we see in
24Table 9 that low educated men married to highly educated women get a higher ￿ than
a highly educated men married to highly educated women. This does not mean that
educated men are worse o⁄ in such marriages, because they receive a higher share from
a negative expected surplus, which may di⁄er in di⁄erent marriages. All we can say is
that in a particular marriage, say a ￿rst marriage of highly educated man and woman,
the wife is more keen to enter the marriage (see Table 9).
TABLE 9
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in ￿rst marriage by education of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L .515 .510 .515
Husband education M .524 .507 .516
H .495 .488 .481
TABLE 10
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in ￿rst marriage for husband and second marriage for
wife by education of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L .593 .617 .620
Husband education M .606 .612 .627
H .542 .570 .618
TABLE 11
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in second marriage for husband and ￿rst marriage for
wife by education of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L .401 .410 .417
Husband education M .436 .399 .414
H .419 .396 .384
25TABLE 12
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in second marriage for husband and wife by education
of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L .481 .481 .522
Husband education M .507 .502 .547
H .476 .433 .515
The surplus shares ￿ are just one component in the gains from marriage that each
partner receives. A broader concept is to look at what single men and women of di⁄erent
types expect to receive if they marry and make the best choice based on their drawn
preferences, "; the systematic gains from the marriage, and the surplus shares that they
receive. Recalling that at any period t; a single man of type i draws a set of taste
preferences for being single or marrying a woman of type j; the expected utility from his
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t0 is the probability that a single woman of type j will choose to remain single at
time t: The expected gains from marriage are then Ui
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(See McFadden, 1984 and Chiappori, Salanie, and Weiss, 2011). In contrast to the
surplus shares ￿ij that represent the relative willingness of partners to enter marriage i;j,
(if faced with that choice), the average shares ￿i;j represents the relative willingness of
26these agents to marry (if allowed to choose whom to marry). The average values of these
alternative shares at di⁄erent types of marriages are displayed in tables 13-16.
TABLE 13




L 0.404 0.409 0.411
Husband education M 0.440 0.445 0.445
H 0.500 0.506 0.506
TABLE 14
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in ￿rst marriage for husband and second marriage for
wife by education of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L 0.245 0.209 0.186
Husband education M 0.275 0.234 0.210
H 0.334 0.288 0.264
TABLE 15
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in second marriage for husband and ￿rst marriage for
wife by education of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L 0.716 0.721 0.722
Husband education M 0.704 0.708 0.709
H 0.752 0.757 0.759
27TABLE 16
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in second marriage for husband and wife by education
of husband and wife
Wife education
L M H
L 0.515 0.455 0.407
Husband education M 0.501 0.441 0.392
H 0.559 0.500 0.453
One can see that in ￿rst marriage and in second for both partners, the husbands￿
average share is about half. However, in marriages in which partners have di⁄erent marital
history, the spouse for whom this is the second marriage receives a substantially higher
share. This large e⁄ect can be traced back to the fact that entry hazards into second
marriages are substantially higher for second marriages than for ￿rst marriages. We also
see that, holding ￿xed the education of the spouse, the shares tend to increase with the
own level of schooling. This is especially true for changes in the education of the husband
while holding ￿xed the education of the wife.
Over all, the surplus shares, ￿; and the shares from the gains from marriage, ￿; tell a
very similar story. This becomes apparent when we recall that ￿ is a share from a negative
number and ￿ is a share from a positive number. The estimated surplus shares, ￿; and
the shares from the gains from marriage, ￿; also resemble the surplus shares estimated in
the collective household literature which are often increasing in the education and lifetime
income of the two spouses (see for example Browning et al. 1994). These patterns are
often interpreted as "power" relationships within couples.
5.7 Changing the de￿nition of marriage
In this subsection we discuss brie￿ y an application of our model to partnerships that
may be either legal marriage or cohabitation, using the same sample (see Gemici and
Laufer 2011 for a comparison of the two types of relationships). As one would expect
the estimated costs of divorce for partnerships are lower than for legal marriages at short
durations of the partnership (see also Brien-Lillard and stern, 2006 and Gemici and Laufer
2011). However, these costs tend to increase with duration because long cohabitations
28are increasingly similar to marriages (see Appendix Tables 2 and 3). As in marriage, the
marital ￿ ow in partnerships is monotone in education. It is also the case that the marital
￿ ow is supermodular with respect to husband and wife education. These ￿ndings re￿ ect
a feature of the data noted above, namely that the assignment patterns in partnerships
and marriage are similar. The qualitative e⁄ects of marriage order on the marital output
￿ ow are also the same. Overall, the basic model is ￿ exible enough to encompass both
partnerships and marriages and most important features of our results are robust to the
de￿nition of marriage that we use.
The quality of ￿t in the combined sample is also very good, except for the entry into
￿rst partnerships where the model overpredicts entry at later ages. Again, unobserved
heterogeneity plays an important role. We ￿nd that the utility of Type 1 agents from
being single is substantially smaller for partnerships than for marriages. Thus, compared
to marriages, more heterogeneity is required to explain the dynamics of partnerships.
5.8 Copenhagen sample
We recognize that the marital surplus shares may di⁄er across marriage markets with
di⁄erent distributions of types even if individual preferences over types remain constant.
To examine the impact of exogenous variation in the distribution of educational types,
we therefore selected a sample of men and women who resided in the Copenhagen area
at least during the ages 25-30. The distribution of agents in this sample by gender and
education is shown in Table 17 below. Comparing with Table 1 for the Denmark sample,
we see that there are substantially more highly educated women in Copenhagen than in
Denmark as a whole. We also note that whereas there are more men than women in the
Denmark sample, the sex ratio is reversed in the Copenhagen sample where there are
more women than men.
29TABLE 17
Sample distribution of male and female completed education in Copenhagen sample
Completed Education (at 46) Men Women
High school or less 34.0 30.4
Vocational education 33.3 32.0
Some college or more 32.7 38.6
No. of observations 5852 6000
We then reestimate the model for the Copenhagen sample under the restriction that
all parameters are the same as those estimated from the Denmark sample, except for the
distribution of the unobserved utility of being single and the surplus shares in marriage.
In Table 18 below, we show the estimated average surplus shares ￿ in ￿rst marriage
for both the husband and the wife by the education of both spouses. Comparing these
expected shares with the estimates in Table 13 for the Denmark sample, we notice two
main di⁄erences. First of all, women with high education receive a lower share of the
expected marital surplus in the Copenhagen sample. This is consistent with the large
fraction of highly educated women in Copenhagen. Secondly, men receive a larger share
of the expected marital surplus in the Copenhagen sample (this is true for seven out of
the nine marriage types displayed in Table 18). This larger share for men in Copenhagen
is consistent with the di⁄erence in the overall sex ratios between Denmark as a whole and
Copenhagen that we mentioned above.
TABLE 18
Estimated average surplus share ￿ in ￿rst marriage for husband and wife by education of
husband and wife in Copenhagen sample
Wife education
L M H
L 0.421 0.415 0.477
Husband education M 0.483 0.476 0.537
H 0.508 0.502 0.562
306 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the complex dynamics of marriage and divorce within a large
Danish cohort which we follow from age 20 to age 46. We focused on the assortative
matching by education and the implications for the marital gains from marriage of di⁄erent
agents. We observe that matching patterns according to education change sharply as the
cohort ages, because agents with di⁄erent education are sorted gradually and because
matches with two highly educated partners are more stable. As the cohort ages, men
with low education are the most likely to be single as they enter marriage at a lower rate
and divorce at a higher rate.
We found that the observed assortative matching by education can be rationalized
by the complementarity in traits within couples, as predicted by theory. The estimated
shares in marriage also respond to the sex ratio and the distributions of female and
male traits in the manner predicted by theory. We found a strong impact of marital
history on the estimated ￿ ow of bene￿ts from marriage and on the relative expected
gains from marriage of husbands and wives. Surprisingly, second marriages are associated
with higher marital output and a higher share of the marital output. At the same time,
second marriages are less stable and associated with a higher divorce rate. We resolve this
apparent contradiction by allowing agents to di⁄er in preferences for singlehood in a way
that is independent of their education. We then show that agents that marry twice have
a larger than average proportion of the type with a higher ￿xed preference to be single.
317 Appendix: Estimated Coe¢ cients
Legal marriages Partnerships
Marital output ￿ ow
Husband low education -0.620 (3.39E-04) -0.709 (2.76E-04)
Husband medium education -0.587 (3.35E-04) -0.527 (2.65E-04)
Husband high education -0.607 (3.32E-04) -0.512 (2.71E-04)
Wife low education -0.411 (4.91E-04) -0.585 (2.94E-04)
Wife medium education -0.261 (4.79E-04) -0.484 (2.86E-04)
Wife high education -0.343 (4.90E-04) -0.492 (2.88E-04)
Both spouses low education 0.0621 (1.27E-05) 0.0720 (1.22E-05)
Both spouses medium education -4.06E-03 (1.18E-05) -0.0122 (1.12E-05)
Both spouses high education 0.176 (1.67E-05) 0.222 (1.23E-05)
1st marriage for both spouses -0.0379 (2.82E-04) 0.0605 (2.32E-04)
Husband 1st, wife 2nd marriage -0.157 (2.85E-04) -0.101 (2.31E-04)
Husband 2nd, wife 1st marriage -0.0792 (2.82E-04) 0.0976 (2.29E-04)
2nd marriage for both spouses 0.0918 (2.78E-04) 0.160 (2.19E-04)
Cost of divorce
1 year of marriage 12.72 (1.61E-04) 9.38 (6.59E-05)
2 years of marriage 17.15 (1.21E-03) 10.31 (6.86E-04)
3 years of marriage 15.42 (1.20E-03) 11.08 (7.44E-04)
4 years of marriage 14.08 (1.15E-03) 11.99 (8.82E-04)
5 years of marriage 14.88 (1.16E-03) 14.20 (1.19E-03)
6 years of marriage 15.40 (1.14E-03) 15.52 (1.35E-03)
7 years of marriage 14.02 (1.08E-03) 17.29 (1.43E-03)
8 years of marriage 15.22 (1.21E-03) 18.42 (1.56E-03)
9 years of marriage 16.02 (1.24E-03) 20.03 (1.66E-03)
10+ years of marriage 17.87 (5.94E-04) 24.40 (6.00E-04)
Estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors in parentheses.
32Legal marriages Partnerships
Utility Singles
Man, 20-22, low education 0.0516 (8.65E-02) 0.0354 (2.25E-02)
Man, 23-25, low education 0.172 (6.23E-02) -0.193 (8.87E-03)
Man, 26-28, low education 0.244 (9.35E-03) 0.110 (5.45E-03)
Man, 29-30, low education 0.0633 (1.72E-02) -0.172 (2.00E-03)
Man, 20-22, medium education 0.272 (8.65E-02) 0.0738 (2.25E-02)
Man, 23-25, medium education 0.262 (6.23E-02) -0.125 (8.86E-03)
Man, 26-28, medium education 0.245 (9.35E-03) 0.0770 (5.46E-03)
Man, 29-30, medium education 0.0395 (1.72E-02) -0.191 (1.99E-03)
Man, 20-22, high education 0.523 (8.65E-02) 0.572 (2.25E-02)
Man, 23-25, high education 0.507 (6.23E-02) 0.154 (8.87E-03)
Man, 26-28, high education 0.474 (9.35E-03) 0.276 (5.44E-03)
Man, 29-30, high education 0.133 (1.72E-02) -0.171 (2.00E-03)
Woman, 20-22, low education 0.395 (8.65E-02) -0.0718 (2.25E-02)
Woman, 23-25, low education 0.301 (6.23E-02) 0.165 (8.87E-03)
Woman, 26-28, low education -0.0214 (9.34E-03) -0.0784 (5.46E-03)
Woman, 29-30, low education 0.141 (1.72E-02) 0.273 (1.99E-03)
Woman, 20-22, medium education 0.707 (8.65E-02) 0.0754 (2.25E-02)
Woman, 23-25, medium education 0.520 (6.23E-02) 0.200 (8.88E-03)
Woman, 26-28, medium education -0.0159 (9.34E-03) -0.103 (5.45E-03)
Woman, 29-30, medium education 0.0622 (1.72E-02) 0.170 (2.00E-03)
Woman, 20-22, high education 1.150 (8.65E-02) 0.159 (2.25E-02)
Woman, 23-25, high education 0.615 (6.23E-02) 0.387 (8.86E-03)
Woman, 26-28, high education 0.215 (9.35E-03) 0.0214 (5.45E-03)
Woman, 29-30, high education 0.147 (1.72E-02) 0.221 (1.99E-03)
Utility u1 men -0.372 (2.77E-05) -0.500 (2.05E-05)
Fraction Type 1 men 0.942 (3.18E-05) 0.913 (1.69E-05)
Utility u1 women -0.345 (2.48E-05) -0.483 (2.04E-05)
Fraction Type 1 women 0.936 (3.21E-05) 0.909 (1.81E-05)
Estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors in parentheses.
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Husband￿ s share ￿ of expected marital gain when both spouses have divorced.
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